in June 1997. A drug addict and petty thief who only a week ago had been arrested after bungling a car burglary, Ashkenazi has been thinking for a while about getting off drugs and putting his life together. But the going has been tough even with the support of his family.
As he walks, he sees that someone has left a black backpack unattended in an open area by the sidewalk. The 30-year-old Ashkenazi looks around but sees no one watching. He picks up the backpack and quickly sneaks off, pleased by his good fortune. Without opening the backpack to inspect his loot, he walks down nearby Geula Street to a rundown apartment building and slips inside. There in the stairwell, he unzips the backpack. Inside he sees a clock with wires connected to a cookie tin, with loose nails surrounding the contraption. Ashkenazi quickly realizes he just stole a bomb.
Panicked but in control, he runs into the nearby Savoy Hotel and rushes up to the reception desk. He tells the clerk what he found and the clerk calls the Tel Aviv police. The bomb squad arrives in minutes and starts trying to deactivate the bomb in the apartment building stairwell. Meanwhile, Ashkenazi stands outside the building, keeping the street clear of passersby and warning a group of children to stay away. The bomb squad finds that the bomb is packed with nearly 3 kilograms of explosives. They successfully neutralize it. Police officers search the beach for more bombs but find none.
At first, Ashkenazi lies to the police and tells them he found the backpack in the apartment building stairwell, where he had gone to urinate, but later confesses to having stolen the backpack. Considering the amount of explosives and the number of people in the area where the bomb was left, police estimate that the bomb would have killed many people in a major terrorist attack, t What criminal Liability should Ashkenazi have for the theft of the backpack, if any? Ashkenazi's conduct constitutes theft; he has taken another's property without the owner's permission. All jurisdictions and scholars agree that, if he had known at the time of the offense what he discovered later--that the bag contained a terrorist bomb--he dearly would have been justified in taking the bag. Indeed, his knowing of the actual circumstances would have made his conduct not just justified but heroic. Of what effect is the fact that he did not know that his taking the bag was justified, that he in fact thought he was committing theft? Should he be liable for theft, which he thought he was committing? Or, should he be exempt from liability became his act, while it normally would have caused a net harm, in this instance caused a net benefit, probably saving many lives?
These questions flame an ongoing dispute in criminal law theory over the nature of justification defenses. Is a justification defense given because the actor's deed in fact avoids a greater harm, the deeds theory of justification, or because of the actor's reason for acting, his justificatory purpose, the reasons theory?
In most cases of justification, both theories are satisfied: the justifying circumstances exist; the actor knows of them and performs the offense conduct because of them. She performs the right deed for the right reason. But in two kinds of cases, the two theories conflict: mistake as to a justification and an unknowingly justified actor.
Where an actor mistakenly believes she is justified, the reasons theory would give a justification defense--for it is only the actor's subjective intent that matters--while the deeds theory would deny a justification defense. But this conflict between the theories ends primarily in a labeling dispute. The actor denied a justification defense under the deeds theory nonetheless will be exculpated trader an excuse defense for her mistake as to a justification, assuming the mistake is reasonable.
The reverse case, where an actor mistakenly believes that she is not justified, act~3ally gives different liability results under the two theories. An unknowingly justified actor has no defense under the Ha'Arets, June 22, 1997; Interview byJon Van Samek with Raine Marcus, Jerusalem Post reporter (July 22, 1997) . reasons theory, with its subjective focus, for she believed her conduct was unjustified. Under the deeds theory, in contrast, her conduct will be justified, because the deeds theory looks to the objective nature of the conduct. The unknowingly justified actor would be liable at most for trying to act unjustifiably--what I will argue later is a standard form of impossible attempt. Thus, while the reasons theory imposes liability for the full substantive offense, the deeds theory imposes only the reduced liability of attempt.
It is for this reason that the case of Motfi Ashkenazi, the bomb thief--perhaps the cleanest case available of the unknowingly justified actor--is so interesting and so important. In an earlier article, I argued in support of the deeds theory. 2 This brief essay tests the theory and its implications in the real world.
II. CURRENT LAW GOVERNING THE UNKNOWINGLY JUSTIFIF.D ACTOR
Most, but not all, American state criminal codes appear to follow the reasons theory, although the apparent clarity of first appearances does not always survive dose inspection. 3 The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code uses a reasons formulation in its justification defenses: an actor is justified "if she believes that her conduct is necessary for defense. 4 Current English law also appears to adopt the reasons theory. Smith and Hogan, for example, conclude that English law "is stated exclusively in terms of the defendant's belief, ''5 citing the cases of Gladstone Williams, Dadson, and Thain. 6 On the other hand, section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, appears to be an exception to the general rule, for it justifies an arrest even if the officer did not at the time know of or believe in the justifying circumstances, 7 reflecting a deeds theory of justification. Clauses 44 and 185 of the proposed Criminal Code for England and Wales appear to broaden this exception to make it the general rule. That is, they would have the law adopt a deeds theory as its general approach. The Draft Code provides a justification defense if the actor "uses such force as, in the circumstances which exist," is immediately necessary and reasonable for defense, s Interestingly, the drafters claim that the provision codifies the common law of self-defense and defense of another. 9 They concede that it modifies the common law of defense of property, but argue that such is necessary to avoid an irrational inconsistency between the rules for the defense of property and person. 1° Israeli law appears to adopt the deeds theory. Sections 34J and 34K of the Israeli Penal Law, self-defense and necessity, respectively, 
7
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 24(4)(a), (5)(a), (7)(a) (providing that an actor may arrest without a warrant "anyone who is guilty of the offence" or words to that effect).
8
A Criminal Code fbr England and Wales, Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill 61, 100 (1989) [hereinafter Draft Code] . The Draft Code also provides a defense if the actor "uses such force as, in the circumstances . . . which he believes to exist," is immediately necessary and reasonable for defense. This does not make the provision one based upon a reasons theory of justification. Nothing in the deeds theory prohibits a defense for mistake as to a justification. On the contrary, it assumes that such a defense will be provided but will be understood to be an excuse. Note that this provision of the Draft Code does not identify either defense as a justification or an excuse. justifying circtmmtances exist. Whether the circumstances actually exist or not is irrdevant. Thus, Ashkenazi's theft is not justified even though it was necessary for the protection of other persons' lives. Ashkenazi's reason for acting was wrong; that his deed was in fact objectively justified is irrelevant. Under the deeds theory, in contrast, the actual nature of the deed is central: Ashkenazi would receive a justification defense even though he did not realize at the time that his conduct was objectively justified. As discussed more fully below, in Section III.C, however, he nonetheless may be liable for an attempt, and thereby receive some, albeit reduced, liability.
JL Disagreement over the Sign~ance of Result'rig Harm
It may be that this disagreement over the proper liability level for the unknowingly justified actor is simply a manifestation of a larger dispute going beyond the nature of justification defenses. The grading disagreement may be simply another battleground in the dispute over the significance of resulting harm. Those who believe that the criminal law ought to focus on conduct and culpable state of mind alone, and that the fortuity of resulting harm ought not affect liability, will naturally prefer the result of the reasons theory. Their view is that only the actor's subjective state of mind should matter to liability. That the unknowingly justified actor believes that his conduct is unjustified is enough in itself to impose full liability, they would argue, just as the person who thinks he has bought illegal drugs or believes he has lit a fuse on dynamite sticks ought to be fully liable even if it turns out that the powder is talcum and the dynamite sticks are wooden. The Model Penal Code, for one, seems to take this view when it adopts a rule that generally punishes attempts to the same extent as the substantive offense. 16 If this is the reason for one's support of a reasons theory of justification, then there is little more to be said on the liability issue. Even if one were to adopt a deeds theory, which gives only attempt liability, under such a pure subjectivist approach attempts would be graded the same as the substantive offense, thereby erasing any difference in the liability results between the theories. Thus, pure subjectivists (i.e., those believing resulting harm ought to be irrelevant to liability) can skip to the next section. They will find there that the community disagrees with their view of the significance of resulting harm, as well as with their view that the unknowingly justified thief ought to be punished the same as the unjustified thief. They also will be interested in Section V, which points out the problem their theory presents in the context of rules governing resistance to an unknowingly justified actor.
Further, as I have argued at length elsewhere, there are other important reasons beyond liability results for preferring the conceptual scheme and terminology of the deeds theory, t7 Only the deeds concept-alization of justification allows the law dearly to identify, with the label "justified," conduct that it condones and will tolerate by others in similar situations in the future. The reasons conceptuali?ation, by including under the same label both justified conduct and mistake as to a justification, frustrates this important ex ante function of law. Conduct performed under a mistaken belief it is justified is not conduct the law wishes to signal as approved in similar circumstances in the future. In fact, it wishes to signal the opposite, that such conduct is to be avoided in the future. By combining both objectively justified conduct and mistaken justification under the same label, "justified," the law hides this important distinction. Under the reasons approach, then, case adjudications in which the defendant is acquitted as "justified" obscure and confuse the public as to the rules of conduct rather than clarify and educate. On these grounds, even the pure subjectivist may conclude that a deeds theory of justification is preferable.
Whatever the logical appeal of the pure subjectivist view, it is a view that exists (and will probably always exist) only in academia. The empirical study reported in Section IV is one of many that confirm a nearly universal view among lay persons that, in their intuitive notions of justice, resulting harm does matter, ts I know of no jurisdiction that a~=lly takes a pure subjectivist view, whatever code drafters may say they prefer. All American jurisdictions, even many of those adopting the Model Penal Code, reject that code's notion that attempts should be punished the same as the substantive offense. Even the Model Penal Code itself is ambivalent in its apparent commitment to a pure subjectivist view. It creates an exception for attempts to commit a firstdegree felony, such as murder. Thus, attempted murder is graded less than murder) 9 More important, if the code really believed in the pure subjectivist view, it would drop all result elements from its offenses, as irrelevant to liability. In fact, it commonly defines offenses as containing a result element. 2° Further, the Model Penal Code drafters selected the most demanding, traditional definition of causation, the necessary cause ("but for") test. 21 If the drafters truly were unabashed subjecfivists, they would at the very least have adopted a weaker causation test, perhaps a sufficient cause test (as was proposed during the American Law Institute floor debate on the causation section). 22 If results ought to be irrelevant but for some unpleasant reason must be maintained, would not the drafters at least want to make it as easy as possible to satisfy those irrelevant result requirements?
It may be that the Model Penal Code drafters grudgingly added result elements to offense definitions and adopted the strong, necessary cause test of causation, because they thought the public would demand it of their criminal law. z3 But this only concedes that the pure sub-,9
Model Penal Code § 5.05(1). 20 E.g:, /d § § 210.1 (Criminal Homicide--"causes the death"), 211.1 (Assault--"causes bodily injury to another"), 220.2(1) (Causing Catastrophe--"person who causes a catastrophe"). z, /d ~ 2.03(1)(a).
22
American Law Institute, Floor Debate on Model Penal Code ~ 2.03(1)(a), A.I-I. Proc. 77-79, 135-39 (1962) (proposing that the actor's conduct be only "a substantial factor in producing the result").
z3
See, e.o~, Model Penal Code § 2.03 comment 257 (1985) ("when severe sanctions are involved.., it cannot be expected that jurors will lightly return verdicts leading to severe sentences in the absence of the resentment aroused by the infliction of serious injuries"). jectivist view of criminal law is one that cannot be sold to those who are to be governed by that law. 24 To insist on a pure subjectivist view would be to undercut the criminal law's moral authority with the public, which in turn would endanger the law's effectiveness. 25
Israeli Penal Law section 27 grades attempts in a way that is similar in some respects to that of the Model Penal Code. It allows judges to impose the same penalty for an attempt as for the substantive offense, which might be taken to suggest a pure subjectivist view. But the section exempts attempts from any mandatory or minimum penalty that would apply to the substantive offense. The true subjectivist would provide no such exemption, of course, for the exemption concedes that attempts are different from the substantive offense in an important way, a way that suggests a liability discount is appropriate where the harm does not come about. In practice, under section 27, a judge may provide a substantial reduction in all attempt cases. The empirical evidence presented in Section IV, below, suggests the community would prefer such a reduction. Thus, if judges concur in the community view, they will follow such a practice. The only effect of section 27, then, is to take away the traditional provision that set the maximum penalty for attempt at less than that for the substantive offense. Given how rarely offenders are sentenced to the statutory maximum, section 27 may be of little effect. 26
Nor can one take the provision as a symbolic commitment to the pure subjectivist view. For, if that were the drafters' intention, there would be no reason for them to retain the result elements of offense definitions. 27 If every substantive offense and attempt deserve the same 
26
Perhaps its primary purpose is to give the pure subjectivist academics a sense that their view is not being ignored.
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Another reason to be skeptical of the idea that the Israeli Penal Law takes a pure subjectivist view is found in the objective formulation of justification defenses, in § § 34J and 34K, noted above. The only effect of having art objective formulation is to give a defense to the unknowingly justified actor--that is, to take account of the fact that he has caused no net harrm If resulting harm is irrdevant--the pure subjectivist punishment upon the same conduct and culpable state of mind, on what ground does the law retain a result element in substantive offenses? At best, one can conclude that the Israeli Penal Law leaves the issue of the significance of resulting harm to sentencing judges. Given this, as well as the Model Penal Code's ambivalence on the same issue, it is worth considering the implications for the unknowingly justified actor of a world where it is conceded that resulting harm does matter to liability.
B. The UnknounMgly Justi~d Actor in a Worm Where Resulting

Harm Matters
If we assume, as the world we know does, that resulting harm ought to increase liability, what theory of justification is preferable? If~people generally think that resulting harm should matter to liability, why do so many writers and code drafters seem to prefer the reasons theory of justification? If state code drafters routinely reject the manifestations of the pure subjectivist view, as in rejecting the Model Penal Code call for grading attempts the same as the complete offense, why would they not also reject the code's subjective formulation of justification defenses? Is this simply the product of an untidy world, where the minority subjectivist view is adopted in the formulation of justification defenses simply because the state code drafters do not see the connection between the issues of subjectivist attempt grading and subjectivist justification formulations? In short, probably yes.
If a jurisdiction admits the significance of resulting harm in assessing liability, if resulting harm may give rise to greater liability than no resulting harm, it seems difficult to see how a jurisdiction can reject the deeds theory of justification, which gives attempt liability to the unknowingly justified actor, in favor of the reasons theory, which ignores view--why would the Penal Law adopt the objective formulation? Indeed, one may wonder about the internal inconsistency of a code that adopts an objective formulation of justification defenses, then makes specific statutory provision to allow judges to grade an attempt the same as the substantive offense. As a matter of general principle, resulting harm is either relevant to the amount of punishment or it is not. Under what theory could the unknowingly justified actor be entided to a dlscount--the effect of the objective justification formulation--but the attempter not? the fact that the conduct in reality causes no net harm. The actor may have thought he or she was causing a net societal harm but be surprised to find that no such net harm occurs, tf the unknowingly justified actor is to be held liable, the liability is analogous to that of the attempter who thinks he is committing an offense, only to be surprised to find out that he is not.
C. Unknowing Just~ation as a Legally Impossible Attempt
The propriety of viewing the unknowingly justified actor as an instance of impossible attempt is confirmed by the fact that such an actor dearly comes within the language of modern attempt provisions. He dearly would be liable for attempt under sections 25 and 26 of the Israeli Penal Law. Similarly, Model Penal Code section 5.01(1)(a) provides: "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be .... ,,2s Under the circumstances as Ashkenazi believed them to be, he is liable for theft. The harm that normally flows from a theft is outweighed in this instance by the benefit derived because of the justifying circumstances. To hold Ashkenazi liable for theft, as the reasons theory would do, is to ignore this central fact. The existence of resulting net harm does matter. Nonetheless, Ashkenazi has the culpable state of mind required for theft and has shown his willingness to act upon it. These are the central characteristics of and rationale for punishing an impossible attempter, and Ashkenazi accordingly deserves to be held liable for attempt.
To deny the status of the unknowingly justified actor as an impossible attempter, and the strength of the conceptual analogy between the two, creates a challenge for reasons theorists. They must argue that the fortuitous lack of harm that undercuts an offense element--the shooter misses because the intended shooting victim bends down just as the trigger is squeezed--ought to reduce the offense grade to that of an attempt, but that the fortuitous lack of a net harm in a justification case--Ashkenazi's theft saves lives--ought not reduce the grade to that of an attempt. On what grounds could such a distinction--between the absence of a harm and the absence of a net harm--be defended?
George Fletcher argues that there is an important difference between violating an offense norm and violating a justification norm; this is the theme of his response to my paper on the subject of twenty years ago. 29 I concede that the two certainly are different. Fletcher's arguments in this respect are persuasive, but then few would disagree with the claim that offenses are concepomily distinct from justification defenses. 3° What Fletcher must show is why the difference between offense rules and justification rules are different in a way that drives us to deviate from our general rule that the presence of resulting harm ought to increase liability over that of an unsuccessful attempt to cause it. I find nothing in his analysis that addresses this central point.
To put the offense-justification distinction in a factual context, consider the following two cases. The actor believes a wind storm is coming but ignores the risk and burns a field's harvest stubble (a common practice by farmers as a low-cost way to increase the fertility of the ground) despite the likelihood that the wind storm will cause the fire he sets to spread to a nearby town. It turns out that the actor is wrong about the wind storm. There never existed any danger to the nearby town, at least no more than the usual no wind storm stubble burning creates. Is the actor guilty of reckless endangerment because he mistakenly believed that he was creating an unlawfifl danger? I think most would say no--reckless endangerment requires proof of a real, not just an imagined unreasonable, risk of harm. 31 At most, the actor could be liable for attempted reckless endangerment, provided such an offense were ,-9
George P. 
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Model Penal Code § 211.2, Reckless Endangerment, provides in part:. "A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury." Thus if an actor does not fully extinguish a campfire, which in turn causes a forest fire to ignite and places a nearby town in imminent danger, the actor will be found guilty of reckless endangerment.
recognized. 32
Now assume the same actor malidously bums his neighbor's cornfield, but the burning serves as a firebreak to an oncoming forest fire about which he did not know. The burning ends up saving the nearby town and is, therefore, justified on the objective facts; in other words, a standard unknowingly justified actor case. I would argue, by analogy to the case above, that the actor ought not be held liable for the full offensewthat is, he ought to get a justification defense--because no net harm occurred. He could be held liable for an attempt, unjustifiably to burn the field (there is no justifying good that comes from his externalized intention unjustifiably to bum the field). If the absence of real danger means the stubble-burner can be punished only for his externalized culpable intention (as an attempt), how, in the absence of any net harm, can the cornfield-burner who saved the town be punished for more than h/s externaliTed culpable intention (as an attempt)?
Note that Professor Fletcher's claim that the issue should be resolved differently in the justification context than in the offense definition context runs into some practical difficulty in modern codes. The Model Penal Code defines recklessness (and negligence) in a way that incorporates the concept ofjustiflcation: it is criminal to disregard a risk (or, in the case of negligence, to be unaware of a risk of which a reasonable person would be aware) that is "substantial and unjustzanea." .,, -,,33 Thus, the application of statutes requiring recklessness or negligence requires an assessment of the justification of the risk, making it impossible toisolate justifications for special treatment apart from offense definitions. A study was recently completed that tested, among other things, the specific claim in dispute here: the community view of liability for the unknowingly justified actor. In this space it would be impossible to recount the details of such research methods or to document their reliability. For a full discussion, the reader is referred to the studies themselves. 35 Generally, the method used to probe subjects' moral intuitions is the "scenario" or "vignette method." Subjects are presented with a short description of a person's conduct and are asked whether and, if so, how much liability and punishment the actor should receive for the conduct. Subjects next are given another scenario, and assess liability and punishment for that actor, then another scenario, and so on. The scenarios are varied by the researchers in ways suggested by the theories being tested, and the patterning of liabilities assigned each scenario provides differential support for the competing theories.
In this study, subjects were given scenarios that included the situations described in the first column of the table below. The second column gives the mean of the subjects' liability judgments from a 13-point scale: a "no liability" option and twelve liability choices, 0 through 11, each with an increasing amount of punishment. Specifically, the subjects were given the following penalty scale: N (no liability) --~ 0 (liability but no punishment) --> 1 (1 day) --> 2 (2 weeks) --> 3 (2 months) --> 4 (6 months) --> 5 (1 year) --~ 6 (3 years) --> 7 (7 years) ---> 8 (15 years) --> 9 (30 years) --> 10 (life) -~ 11 (death). E$, George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Crinu'na/Law 555-56 (1978) ; 2 Robinson, supra note 3, at 24.
3s
The specific findings reported here appear in Paul H. Scenario 2, another control case, is an unsuccessful attempt to cause the harm actually caused in scenario 1. The liability assigned by the subjects is 3.52 (just over 4 months). This is consistent with other published research, which found substantially reduced punishment based solely on the fortuitous absence of the intended harm. Indeed, the ratio of penalties between scenarios 1 and 2 is consistent with those jurisdictions that set the grade of an attempt as one grade less than, or at half the penalty of, the substantive offense. 37 (On the exponential penalty scale used in the study, one unit is equivalent to one offense grade in a typical modem American criminal code, and each higher grade typically doubles the penalty of the previous grade.) Scenario 6, another control case, is an intentional justified burning. As expected, it received essentially no punishment. Its liability mean was 0.57. Among the subjects 38.5 percent gave no liability. Another 40.4 percent gave liability but no punishment. The remaining 21.2 percent gave punishment ranging from 1 day to 1 year. This baseline is not as low as one might have guessed but still reflects the predicted judgment that the vast majority of subjects see the case as one of little or no blameworthiness, despite the fact that an intentional harm is caused.
Turning to the test scenarios, scenario 7, presenting the unknowingly justified actor, confirms the predictions of the deeds theory. The perpetrator in scenario 7 receives a liability mean of 3.63 (just over 4 months). This is not statistically different from the attempt control case in scenario 2, as the deeds theory predicts. Such liability is dramatically less than the 4.65 liability (about 10 months) for the substantive offense that the reasons theory predicts. The deeds theory is dearly more consistent with community views on this matter.
(Scenario 8 presents the case of the actor who knows of the justifying circumstances but who acts for other, nonjustificatory motives. Recall that current law would give a complete defense in such a case--the actor "believes" in the justifying circumstances but is not
37
See the statutes listed in Paul H. Robinson, Fundamenta/s of CriminalLaw 297 (2d eck 1995). motivated by them--although logic would seem to suggest that a strict reasons theory would give no defense. The liability mean is 2.10 (2.6 weeks), not the complete defense that current law would provide--only 7.8 percent of our subjects assigned a verdict of no liability--and not the filll liability that the reasons theory logically would seem to suggest. It is consistent, however, with the deeds theory prediction of liability of somewhat less than that of the unknowingly justified actor. The actor is entitled to at least the discount given the unknowingly justified actor because his act is objectively justified; a greater harm in fact is avoided. Unlike the unknowingly justified actor, however, this actor's liability for attempt is less dear. His knowledge of the justifying circumstances may suggest to him that his conduct is not in fact criminal; thus he has not the clear intention to violate the law that the unknowingly justified actor has. He might be viewed less as breaking the law than as taking advantage of it. In any case, the results again are consistent with the deeds view and inconsistent with the reasons view.)
V. LIABIHTY FOR RESISTING AN UNKNOWINGLY JU~D ACTOR
Beyond the issue of liability for the unknowingly justified actor, the competing theories of justification have implications for the lawfulness of resisting the unknowingly justified actor. Assume the terrorist in the Ashkenazi case is watching his planted backpack from a distance, waiting to see the bomb go off and the resulting mayhem. He sees Ashkenazi steal the bag and confronts him, demanding its return. Can the terrorist or an accomplice lawfully use force against Ashkenazi to regain control of the bag? In other words, should one be able lawfiflly to resist a person who one knows is an unknowingly justified actor? Under the deeds theory, Ashkenazi's conduct is justified, and therefore the terrorist cannot lawfully resist it. But the reasons theory makes the actual justified nature of the deed irrelevant. Because he acts for the wrong reason, the unknowingly justified actor is not justified. He is acting "unlawfully," which traditionally creates a right lawfully to resist the conduct. Yet logic tells us here again that reasons theory gives improper results. 3s Whether the deed is or is not act3,=lly justified ought to be central to whether the law authorizes resistance to it. 39
An analysis of the statutory provisions confirms these results: the reasons-based Model Penal Code would give the terrorist a right forcibly to resist Ashkenazi's taking; the deeds-based Draft Criminal Code of England and Wales would not.
Because Ashkenazi does not have the "belief" required for a justification, his theft, even though it is necessary to save the people on the beach, is not "justified" under the Model Penal Code. 4° Under the code, an actor can interfere with conduct that is "unlawful. ''41 (Israeli Penal Law section 34J has a similar requirement that defensive conduct is permitted only against "unlawful" attack.) Is Ashkenazi's unjustified conduct "unlawful"? Model Penal Code section 3.11(1) defines "unlawful force" as: "force... which.., would constitute [an] offense • .. except for a defense . .. not amounting to a privilege to use the force." Ashkenazi has no defense to his theft; he will in fact be held fully liable for it under the Model Penal Code. Thus, his theft is "unlawful" and, therefore, the terrorist lawfully can resist his taking under the code, even though he (the terrorist) knows of the justifying facts! In other words, even the contorted definition of "unlawful force" in section 3.11(1) does not save the Model Penal Code from improper results. In the context of the unknowingly justified actor, the code's reasons formulation of justification has a real and a detrimental effect. While its effect is likely inadvertent--it is hard to believe that the ~s
The reasons advocate might argue that the terrorist is not justified in interfering because he does not have the proper justificatory purpose; he knows what Ashkenazi does not, that the bag contains a deadly bomb. But the doctrine they have created would describe the terrorist's conduct and state of mind as resisting an "unjustified" theft, which surely a person is authorized to do. Immediately following in the text is an analysis of the reasons theory statutory formulations that shows just this conclusion. Once the reasons advocate strips the unknowingly justified actor of the protection of being "justified," it becomes difficult in resurrecting that privilege to avoid resistance by others.
39
If the resister were unaware of the justifying circumstances, of course she may be entided to an excuse for mistaken justification.
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Model Penal Code § 3.02. Id § 3.06. drafters actually intended such a result--it demonstrates the dangers of constructing a code using the reasons approach. Note that the Draft Criminal Code for England and Wales avoids this error by providing an objective form of justification. Whether the terrorist lawfully may interfere with Ashkenazi's theft under the proposed code depends upon whether Ashkenazi's theft is "unlawful," as defined by section 44(3). Ashkenazi would have a defense to his theft under section 44(1)(c); 42 the circumstances exist that make his theft necessary to protect others even though he does not know of those circumstances. But his defense will not be one of those enumerated in section 44(3), situations in which, despite resulting in an acquittal, the conduct nonetheless is held to be "unlawful." Ashkenazi's defense is not that he thought his theft was necessary, as would be relevant under section 44(1)(c), for example, but rather that his theft was in fact necessary. Therefore, his conduct is not "unlawful" under section 44 (3) and, therefore, the terrorist cannot lawfully resist it--the proper result. 43
4,
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The deeds and reasons theories give different results for both an unknowingly justified actor and a person resisting such an actor. The reasons theory gives no defense to an unknowingly justified actor; thus full liability. The deeds theory gives a justification defense, but the unknowingly justified actor nonetheless is liable for an impossible
42
"A person does not commit an offense by using such force as, in the circumstances which exist or which he believes to exist, is immediately necessary and reasonable •.. (c) to protect himself or another from unlawfiA force or unlawful personal harm..
• ." Draft Code, supra note 8, § 44(1)(c).
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Ashkenazi may be liable for an impossible attempt under ~ ~ § 49-50, and his conduct might be considered "unlawful" for the purposes of/d § 44 on this ground, which would give the wrong result of allowing the terrorist lawfully to intervene. But this difficulty with the Draft Code could be fixed with minor changes by making dear that the right to use force depends upon the "unlawfulness" of the actual conduct, not the conduct mistakenly envisioned in the mind of the person being defended against. attempt in most modern code jurisdictions. The deeds approach, then, generates the proper result, a conclusion confirmed by the empirical study showing that lay persons see the unknowingly justified actor as liable at the reduced attempt level, not at the level of fifll substantive liability that the reasons theory would provide.
The two theories also give different liability results for a person who resists an unknowingly justified actor. The reasons theory, having concluded that the unknowingly justified actor's conduct is unjustified, allows a person lawfully to resist the justified conduct. This is the result tinder the Model Penal Code, but surely it is the wrong result (and may not have been intended by the drafters) for it allows a person lawfully to engage in conduct that the person knows to be against society's interest. The deeds theory, in contrast, properly denies a defense to one who resists one he knows to be an unknowingly justified actor. 44
These liability results, together with the labeling advantages of the deeds theory in distinguishing objective justification from subjective, mistaken justification, 45 suggest that justification theory and law ought 44 Russell Christopher challenges the deeds theory by offering this hypothetical: assume two unknowingly justified actors, each of whom is about to attack the other for malicious reasons, unaware that their attacks are in fact objectively justified. Both acts would seem to be justified under the deeds theory, Christopher argues, which is not possible. My analysis would be to find that each actor is justified (to the extent that his conduct is in fact necessaryfbr defense, which may require an impossible manipulation of the facts--but assume such would be possible). Does this conclusion create a problem for the deeds theory? I think not. It is normally true that for two actors in combat only one is justified; either one's conduct or the other's creates a net harm, not both. But the point of this hypothetical is to superimpose two justification situations on top of one another. But this does not alter our assessment of each of the attacks and the response to it. Both initial attacks are unjustified; both defenses to the attacks are justified; both actors are liable for attempt for their unknowingly justified use of force. In each instance, the deeds theory wants to announce that such conduct (the unknowingly justified defensive conduct) is justified under such circumstances (because of the original unjustified attack) for similar actors in similar situations in the future. (One might even argue that both actors are liable for assault based upon their original unjustified attacks. If the attacks start simultaneously, at their origin both are aggressive, rather than defensive, and therefore not justified. This analysis, however, would not support liability for any resulting injury, because the later conduct causing injury would have occurred after the unjustified attack began and therefore would be unknowingly justified.)
~5
See supra text accompanying and follo~ng note 17.
to follow a deeds theory rather than the reasons theory currendy more popular. 46 What is the implication of the reasons-deeds dispute for Motti Ashkenazi? Because of the lives saved by his actions, the police decide not to charge Ashkenazi in the theft, and allow him an easy plea bargain in another case pending against him. Ashkenazi becomes a bit of a hero in Tel Aviv.
On the other hand, there is criticism of the police and prosecutors for letting him off easy. He becomes a bit of a comic hero. He is lampooned on a late-night talk show for his "good deed." The talk show Some writers, such as Fletcher, have urged a dual requirement: that the actor both perform the right deed and act for the right reason. I find such a dual requirement pu~ling. I understand the theory behind the reasons approach: a justification defense ought to depend upon whether the actor thought he was justified; many theorists believe that an actor's externalized culpable state of mind ought to be the sole criterion for criminal liability. I also understand, and support, the theory behind the deeds approach: that the defense ought to depend upon the absence of a net resulting harm; no net harm renders the unknowingly justified actor an impossible attempter, who, like any at-tempter, deserves less liability than one who actually brings about the harm or evil of the substantive offense. I do not, however, understand the theory behind this dual requirement approach. It seems internally inconsistent in its view on the significance of resulting harm and on the sufficiency of culpability as grounds for full liability. How would one articulate the general theory of liability behind requiting both the fight reason and the right deed? Is the absence of a net harm significant or not? Is externalized culpability suffident for full substantive liability or not? Apparendy, the answer to these questions is different in different situations-mistakenly justified and unknowingly justified --but k is not apparent why the answers to such questions should depend on the factual situation.
Even if one could articulate a theory for the dual requirement, it would not necessarily answer the many objections to the reasons theory, for it too denies a defense to and thereby imposes full liability on the unknowingly jusffied actor. To review, a reasons theory denies the significance of the analogy between the unknowingly justified actor and the impossible attempter. That is, by denying a defense to the unknowingly justified actor, it treats him as indistinguishable from the actor with a similar culpable state of mind who is not objectively justified. The dual requirement approach would do the same. Further, the reasons theory, by denying a justification to the unknowingly justified actor, authorizes others lawfully to resist that objectively justified conduct. Thus, because the unknowingly justified actor is treated as unjustified, even one who knows of the jusfififing circumstances can lawfully resist him. The dual requirement approach suffers the same defect.
host envisions a drugged out Ashkenazi invited to meet the president and reimbursed for the income he lost when the backpack did not contain valuables. The conflicting feelings about the Ashkenazi case are understandable.
Under a deeds theory, Ashkenazi's conduct is recognized as beneficial, and it is given a legal status reflecting that benefit: it is justified, and therefore beyond lawful interference by others. Much of the expressed public admiration for what Ashkenazi did bespeaks this feeling.
But the deeds theory also draws an important distinction between Ashkenazi's conduct, which is admirable, and his motivation, which is reprehensible. The deeds theory would privilege the conduct against interference but would impose liability and punishment on Ashkenazi for his demonstrated willingness to commit what he thought was an unjustified theft. While the terrorist could not lawfully interfere with him, Ashkenazi himself would be liable for attempted theft.
While public admiration for Ashkenazi's deed can easily spill over to admiration for the man, it ought to be resisted. There is societal value in publicly admiring the conduct, for it signals to all that such conduct would be encouraged in the future, even would be thought of as heroic. But there is also societal value in making clear that Ashkenazi himself is to be condemned, for it is only in this way that the norm against theft can be unambiguously reinforced.
By defining justifications subjectively, the reasons theory obscures this key distinction: it allows the law to announce only whether an actor is "justified"; it allows the law no mechanism by which it can announce the character of the act. The deeds theory, in contrast, highlights the distinction between the act and the actor. Ashkenazi's act may be praised, while Ashkenazi is condemned.
The reasons theory also misses the mark when it sees Ashkenazi as no different from other thieves, and thus liable for full substantive liability. Ashkenazi and other thieves are different, as different as are an attempted murderer and a murderer. The latter has caused a net harm; the former has only tried to. One may hope that, if exposed to the deeds theory of justification--and its implication that Ashkenazi is properly treated as an attempter--reason theory supporters may find the deeds view more appealing.
